Here’s a bit more on Israel’s post-Disengagement strategy. Shalom Harari and Mark A. Heller, writing in the same issue of Strategic Assessment that I cited earlier, predict that Israel will try to remain engaged with the Palestinian leadership, but without making any further territorial concessions in the short term…
Israeli politics are likely to be paralyzed after September 2005 by coalition crises and the possibility that the country will enter a pre-election phase. Therefore, the Israeli government is apparently planning to buy time and create a sense of motion without movement by instituting some confidence-building measures (CBMs). Measures under consideration include the opening of a seaport and airport in Gaza, expansion of the maritime operating space available to Gaza fishermen, the release of substantial numbers of “high quality” prisoners, authorization of voting rights for those prisoners remaining in jail, institution of some arrangement for “safe passage” (or “semi-safe passage” between Gaza and the West Bank), and support for efforts to reequip Palestinian security forces and mobilize financial assistance to Gaza.
Israel’s Foreign Minister, Silvan Shalom, reaffirmed in an interview with Kuwaiti daily Wednesday (reported by the AP) that Gaza would have a working seaport and an open border with Egypt. He added:
No topics, including Jerusalem, were off-limits to peace negotiations with the Palestinians, the Israeli official said. However, confidence should be built before final status talks on Jerusalem - which Palestinians claim as the capital of their state - refugees, borders, and water, he said.
Not suprisingly, he made further moves contingent on Gaza not becoming a base for terrorist activities against Israel.
The same day, Ambassador Danny Ayalon was warning reporters in Washington, DC that Hamas is using the lull in fighting to build its military strength in anticipation of continuing armed conflict.
We observe a very massive buildup with recruitment and training of new terrorists, of mobilizing more financial support and explosive munitions, and having the cells ready and the chain of command ready…This is literally a ticking bomb that can explode whenever they find it suitable to their purposes.
Of note, he also said that “Hamas is a threat to the Palestinian Authority as well as to Israel, and does not have the support of a majority of the Palestinian population“.
I take that last as a sign that Sharon is, to a limited degree, throwing his lot in with Abbas. It used to be that all Palestinians were terrorists. Now Abbas is - well, a weak reed, but at least in a parallel position to Israel against Hamas.
Ayalon’s main point, though, that Israel is still a nation under siege, in need of steadfast support. Israel’s strategy vis a vis America hasn’t changed at all.
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